Attachment 128 Details for Bug 324 – KRB4/5 auth with privsep

[patch] KRB4/5 auth with privsep

patch-openssh-privsep-krbafs (text/plain), 11.86 KB, created by Jan Iven on 2002-07-03 19:56:04 AEST

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Creator: Jan Iven

Created: 2002-07-03 19:56:04 AEST

Size: 11.86 KB

patch

obsolete

>--- openssh-3.4p1/auth-krb5.c	Sun Jun  9 21:41:48 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/auth-krb5.c	Sat Jun 29 22:57:35 2002
>@@ -70,21 +70,19 @@
> /*
>  * Try krb5 authentication. server_user is passed for logging purposes
>  * only, in auth is received ticket, in client is returned principal
>- * from the ticket
>+ * from the ticket, put things to send back in reply.
>  */
> int
>-auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client)
>+auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *reply)
> {
> 	krb5_error_code problem;
> 	krb5_principal server;
>-	krb5_data reply;
> 	krb5_ticket *ticket;
> 	int fd, ret;
> 
> 	ret = 0;
> 	server = NULL;
> 	ticket = NULL;
>-	reply.length = 0;
> 
> 	problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
> 	if (problem)
>@@ -131,7 +129,7 @@
> 
> 	/* if client wants mutual auth */
> 	problem = krb5_mk_rep(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,
>-	    &reply);
>+	    reply);
> 	if (problem)
> 		goto err;
> 
>@@ -144,10 +142,7 @@
> 		krb5_unparse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
> 		    client);
> 
>-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
>-	packet_put_string((char *) reply.data, reply.length);
>-	packet_send();
>-	packet_write_wait();
>+	/* sending reply in caller */
> 
> 	ret = 1;
>  err:
>@@ -155,8 +150,6 @@
> 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
> 	if (ticket)
> 		krb5_free_ticket(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket);
>-	if (reply.length)
>-		xfree(reply.data);
> 
> 	if (problem) {
> 		if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)
>--- openssh-3.4p1/sshconnect1.c	Thu Jun  6 21:57:34 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/sshconnect1.c	Fri Jun 28 15:26:13 2002
>@@ -398,9 +398,10 @@
> 	struct stat st;
> 
> 	/* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
>-	if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
>+	if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) {
>+		debug("Kerberos v4: no ticket file %s",tkt_string());
> 		return 0;
>-
>+	}
> 	strlcpy(inst, (char *)krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname(1)),
> 	    INST_SZ);
> 
>--- openssh-3.4p1/auth1.c	Fri Jun 21 08:21:11 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/auth1.c	Sat Jun 29 22:57:55 2002
>@@ -119,13 +119,19 @@
> 				if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */
> #ifdef KRB4
> 					KTEXT_ST tkt;
>-
>+					KTEXT_ST reply;
> 					tkt.length = dlen;
> 					if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
> 						memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length);
> 
>-					if (auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) {
>+					if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user, &reply))) {
> 						authenticated = 1;
>+
>+						packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
>+						packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
>+						packet_send();
>+						packet_write_wait();
>+
> 						snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
> 						    " tktuser %.100s",
> 						    client_user);
>@@ -133,16 +139,25 @@
> #endif /* KRB4 */
> 				} else {
> #ifdef KRB5
>-					krb5_data tkt;
>+				  	krb5_data tkt, reply;
> 					tkt.length = dlen;
> 					tkt.data = kdata;
>+					reply.length = 0;
> 
>-					if (auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) {
>+					if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user, &reply))) {
> 						authenticated = 1;
>+
>+						packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
>+						packet_put_string((char *) reply.data, reply.length);
>+						packet_send();
>+						packet_write_wait();
> 						snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
> 						    " tktuser %.100s",
> 						    client_user);
> 					}
>+					if (reply.length)
>+				        	xfree(reply.data);
>+
> #endif /* KRB5 */
> 				}
> 				xfree(kdata);
>--- openssh-3.4p1/auth-krb4.c	Tue Jun 11 18:42:49 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/auth-krb4.c	Sat Jun 29 23:53:10 2002
>@@ -210,10 +210,9 @@
> }
> 
> int
>-auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
>+auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client, KTEXT reply)
> {
> 	AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
>-	KTEXT_ST reply;
> 	Key_schedule schedule;
> 	struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
> 	char instance[INST_SZ];
>@@ -263,21 +262,16 @@
> 
> 	/* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
> 	   empty message, admitting our failure. */
>-	if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
>+	if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply->dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
> 	    schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
> 		debug("Kerberos v4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
>-		reply.dat[0] = 0;
>-		reply.length = 0;
>+		reply->dat[0] = 0;
>+		reply->length = 0;
> 	} else
>-		reply.length = r;
>+		reply->length = r;
> 
> 	/* Clear session key. */
> 	memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session));
>-
>-	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
>-	packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
>-	packet_send();
>-	packet_write_wait();
> 	return (1);
> }
> #endif /* KRB4 */
>--- openssh-3.4p1/monitor.h	Tue Jun 11 18:42:49 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/monitor.h	Sun Jun 30 00:01:48 2002
>@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@
> 	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
> 	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
> 	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
>+#ifdef KRB4
>+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHKRB4, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHKRB4,
>+#endif
>+#ifdef KRB5
>+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHKRB5, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHKRB5,
>+#endif
> 	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
> 	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD,
> 	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
>--- openssh-3.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	Fri Jun 21 02:43:43 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/monitor_wrap.c	Sun Jun 30 00:04:19 2002
>@@ -268,6 +268,75 @@
> 	return (authenticated);
> }
> 
>+/* do Kerberos4 .klogin authentication */
>+#ifdef KRB4
>+int
>+mm_auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client, KTEXT reply)
>+{
>+ 	Buffer m;
>+	int rlen;
>+	int authenticated = 0;
>+	char* reply_tmp;
>+
>+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
>+
>+	buffer_init(&m);
>+	buffer_put_string(&m, auth->dat, auth->length);
>+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHKRB4, &m);
>+
>+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHKRB4", __func__);
>+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHKRB4, &m);
>+
>+	authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
>+	if(authenticated) {
>+		*client = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
>+		reply_tmp =  buffer_get_string(&m, &rlen);
>+		/* have to get the string back into the fixed char field */
>+		if(rlen >= MAX_KTXT_LEN)
>+		 fatal("%s: received too large KRB4 reply from monitor", __func__);
>+		memcpy(reply->dat, reply_tmp, rlen);
>+		reply->length = rlen;
>+		memset(reply_tmp,0, rlen);
>+		xfree(reply_tmp);
>+	}
>+	buffer_free(&m);
>+
>+	debug3("%s: user %s %sauthenticated",
>+	    __func__, *client, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
>+	return (authenticated); 
>+}
>+#endif /* KRB4 */
>+
>+/* do Kerberos5 .klogin authentication */
>+#ifdef KRB5
>+int
>+mm_auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *reply)
>+{
>+ 	Buffer m;
>+	int authenticated = 0;
>+
>+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
>+
>+	buffer_init(&m);
>+	buffer_put_string(&m, auth->data, auth->length);
>+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHKRB5, &m);
>+
>+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHKRB5", __func__);
>+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHKRB5, &m);
>+
>+	authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
>+	if(authenticated) {
>+		*client = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
>+		reply->data =  buffer_get_string(&m, &(reply->length));
>+	}
>+	buffer_free(&m);
>+
>+	debug3("%s: user %s %sauthenticated",
>+	    __func__, *client, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
>+	return (authenticated); 
>+}
>+#endif /* KRB5 */
>+
> int
> mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
> {
>--- openssh-3.4p1/auth.h	Thu Jun  6 22:52:37 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/auth.h	Sun Jun 30 00:07:33 2002
>@@ -113,20 +113,20 @@
> 
> #ifdef KRB4
> #include <krb.h>
>-int     auth_krb4(Authctxt *, KTEXT, char **);
>+int     auth_krb4(Authctxt *, KTEXT, char **, KTEXT);
> int	auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
> void    krb4_cleanup_proc(void *);
> 
> #ifdef AFS
> #include <kafs.h>
> int     auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *, const char *);
> int     auth_afs_token(Authctxt *, const char *);
> #endif /* AFS */
> 
> #endif /* KRB4 */
> 
> #ifdef KRB5
>-int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client);
>+int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *reply);
> int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
> int	auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
> void	krb5_cleanup_proc(void *authctxt);
>--- openssh-3.4p1/monitor.c	Wed Jun 26 15:27:11 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/monitor.c	Tue Jul  2 11:19:19 2002
>@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@
> int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
> int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
> int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
>+#ifdef KRB4
>+int mm_answer_authkrb4(int, Buffer *);
>+#endif
>+#ifdef KRB5
>+int mm_answer_authkrb5(int, Buffer *);
>+#endif
> int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
> int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
> int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
>@@ -188,6 +199,12 @@
>     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
>     {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
>     {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
>+#ifdef KRB4
>+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHKRB4, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authkrb4},
>+#endif
>+#ifdef KRB5
>+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHKRB5, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authkrb5},
>+#endif
> #ifdef BSD_AUTH
>     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
>     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
>@@ -719,6 +746,87 @@
> }
> #endif
> 
>+#ifdef KRB4
>+int
>+mm_answer_authkrb4(int socket, Buffer *m)
>+{
>+	KTEXT_ST auth;
>+	KTEXT_ST reply;
>+	char  *localuser, *auth_tmp;
>+	int authenticated, authlen;
>+
>+	auth_tmp = buffer_get_string(m, &authlen);
>+	if (authlen >=  MAX_KTXT_LEN)
>+		 fatal("%s: received too large KRB4 auth from privsep", __func__);
>+	memcpy(auth.dat, auth_tmp, authlen);
>+	auth.length = authlen;
>+        memset(auth_tmp,0, authlen);
>+	xfree(auth_tmp);
>+	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
>+	authenticated = options.kerberos_authentication &&
>+		authctxt->valid &&
>+		auth_krb4(authctxt, &auth, &localuser, &reply);
>+
>+	memset(auth.dat, 0, authlen);
>+
>+	buffer_clear(m);
>+	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
>+	if(authenticated) {
>+		buffer_put_cstring(m, localuser);
>+		buffer_put_string(m, reply.dat, reply.length);
>+	}
>+	  
>+	memset(reply.dat, 0, reply.length);
>+
>+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
>+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHKRB4, m);
>+
>+	auth_method = "KRB4.klogin";
>+
>+	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
>+	return (authenticated);
>+}
>+#endif /* KRB4 */
>+
>+#ifdef KRB5
>+int
>+mm_answer_authkrb5(int socket, Buffer *m)
>+{
>+	krb5_data auth;
>+	krb5_data reply;
>+	char  *localuser;
>+	int authenticated;
>+
>+	auth.data = buffer_get_string(m, &auth.length);
>+
>+	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
>+	authenticated = options.kerberos_authentication &&
>+		authctxt->valid &&
>+		auth_krb5(authctxt, &auth, &localuser, &reply);
>+
>+	memset(auth.data, 0, auth.length);
>+	xfree(auth.data);
>+
>+	buffer_clear(m);
>+	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
>+	if(authenticated) {
>+		buffer_put_cstring(m, localuser);
>+		buffer_put_string(m, reply.data, reply.length);
>+	}
>+	  
>+	memset(reply.data, 0, reply.length);
>+	xfree(reply.data);
>+
>+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
>+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHKRB5, m);
>+
>+	auth_method = "KRB5.klogin";
>+
>+	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
>+	return (authenticated);
>+}
>+#endif /* KRB5 */
>+
> #ifdef USE_PAM
> int
> mm_answer_pam_start(int socket, Buffer *m)
>--- openssh-3.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	Mon May 13 03:07:42 2002
>+++ openssh-3.4p1.CERN/monitor_wrap.h	Sun Jun 30 00:52:23 2002
>@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@
> #include "key.h"
> #include "buffer.h"
> 
>+#ifdef KRB4
>+#include <krb.h>
>+#endif
>+
>+#ifdef KRB5
>+#include <krb5.h>
>+#endif
>+
> extern int use_privsep;
> #define PRIVSEP(x)	(use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
> 
>@@ -59,6 +67,18 @@
> void mm_start_pam(char *);
> #endif
> 
>+#ifdef KRB4
>+int mm_auth_krb4(struct Authctxt *, KTEXT , char **, KTEXT );
>+#endif
>+
>+#ifdef AFS
>+int mm_auth_krb4_tgt(struct Authctxt *, const char *, const int);
>+#endif 
>+
>+#ifdef KRB5
>+int mm_auth_krb5(struct Authctxt *, krb5_data *, char **, krb5_data *);
>+#endif
>+
> void mm_terminate(void);
> int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);
> void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(void *);

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