Attachment 3282 Details for Bug 3008 – Add no-op implementation of pam_putenv

[patch] Add no-op implementation of pam_putenv

ssh-pam_putenv.patch (text/plain), 1.23 KB, created by Darren Tucker on 2019-05-14 10:59:01 AEST

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Creator: Darren Tucker

Created: 2019-05-14 10:59:01 AEST

Size: 1.23 KB

patch

obsolete

>diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
>index bde0a8f5..289d9f4f 100644
>--- a/auth-pam.c
>+++ b/auth-pam.c
>@@ -266,6 +266,14 @@ pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
> }
> #endif
> 
>+#ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
>+static int
>+pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value)
>+{
>+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
>+}
>+#endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */
>+
> /*
>  * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
>  * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
>@@ -360,13 +368,11 @@ import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
> 	for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
> 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0)
> 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
>-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
> 		/* Errors are not fatal here */
> 		if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
> 			error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
> 			    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r));
> 		}
>-#endif
> 		/* XXX leak env? */
> 	}
> #endif
>@@ -1205,7 +1211,6 @@ int
> do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
> {
> 	int ret = 1;
>-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
> 	char *compound;
> 	size_t len;
> 
>@@ -1215,7 +1220,6 @@ do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
> 	snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
> 	ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
> 	free(compound);
>-#endif
> 
> 	return (ret);
> }

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djm: ok+

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Attachments on bug 3008: 3281 | 3282