The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol allows remote attackers (from the client side) to send arbitrary numbers that are actually not public keys, and trigger expensive server-side DHE modular-exponentiation calculations, aka a D(HE)ater attack. We have repeated the attack when establish ssh connections. What will openssh do to avoid dheater?
Not based on that attack, it's AFAIK a denial of service only that is already mitigated by existing measures in sshd including LoginGraceTime and MaxStartups.
Is it a vulnerability in DHE algorithm protocol, not in openssh?
It's probably an intrinsic issue to any cryptographic key agreement protocol that an attacker can cause the server to do useless work. I don't think ECDSA or any of the PQ KEM algorithms will be any less susceptible, though they are faster so the impact is less.
OpenSSH 9.3 has been released. Close resolved bugs